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Abstract 
In Australia, a corporate acquisition can be effected by either a scheme of arrangement or a 
takeover. We investigate whether lower takeover premiums in schemes are the result of 
potential self-dealing by target firm directors. Specifically, we examine the likelihood that one 
pay-off to target directors for accepting a lower premium in a scheme is a seat on the acquiring 
firm’s board. We find the odds of a target director subsequently sitting on the merged entities’ 
board are significantly higher in schemes. We also find no association between the target 
director appointment to the board and the merged entity’s post- acquisition performance. 
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1 Introduction 
Prior research documents that director incentives have important implications for 
shareholders in corporate takeovers.  Our study examines whether choice of deal structure 
provides potential benefits for target firm directors.  In Australia, there are two channels for 
acquiring control of publicly listed companies. One channel entails a highly regulated 
takeover bid that provides for a competitive public auction. The other channel is a “scheme of 
arrangement” (SOA) requiring the cooperation of the target and bidder firm boards and the 
approval of the target firms’ shareholders as well as the Court. As a SOA requires the active 
cooperation of the target’s board (hence often described as “friendly”) the target firm’s board 
has more scope to block the acquisition. A further attraction of schemes to acquirers is the 
lower shareholder approval threshold to achieve 100% ownership. Whilst only 75% of target 
shareholders must approve a scheme, a bidder must acquire 90% of shares in a takeover to be 
able to compulsorily acquire the remaining shares. 
Earlier commentary in the financial press argued that target shareholders are disadvantaged in 
schemes (Askew, 2003, Hughes, 2003) relative to takeovers. Bugeja et al., (2016) empirically 
test these assertions and document that bid premiums are systematically lower when firms are 
acquired via schemes. The results in that study raise the question as to why target firm 
directors are willing to structure the deal as a SOA and recommend an acquisition at a 
premium which is lower than that which could be potentially received in a takeover.  This 
study addresses that question by examining whether target firm directors are induced to 
structure a deal as a SOA in return for a private benefit.  The specific research question we 
test is whether target firm directors are more likely to receive a board seat post- acquisition 
on the board of the merged entity in SOA than in takeover offers.  
To be clear: our analysis does not assume that the alternative to a scheme of arrangement is 
necessarily a takeover bid. One can envisage cases where a firm is not worth taking over if 
bidders are required to pay a price at the average premium offered in a takeover bid. In these 
circumstances, there would be no takeover bid in the absence of a scheme of arrangement and 
target shareholders would miss out on the takeover premium. The policy issue we address is 
the appropriateness of directors’ accepting inducements narrowly targeted to their self-
interest in return for facilitating a scheme of arrangement. We acknowledge that our study 
cannot determine directional causality between scheme use and director appointment, 
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however documenting an association is likely to be of concern and interest to shareholders 
and regulators alike.1 
The research question we address is economically significant given the increasing use of 
schemes to facilitate a change in corporate control. Bugeja et al., (2016) document that in 
most years between 2007 and 2011 the value of deals structured as SOA vastly exceeds those 
organised as takeover bids. Pertinently, the allegations that target shareholders are 
disadvantaged in schemes prompted the Australian Government’s Corporations and Markets 
Advisory Committee (CAMAC) to investigate the issue in 2008. CAMAC’s final report 
issued in December 2009 recommended against any substantive changes in the use of 
schemes to effect a change in corporate control. CAMAC’s recommendation of retaining the 
status quo with respect to schemes notwithstanding their association with lower premiums for 
control is understandable given that, as noted earlier, there is no certainty that acquisitions 
effected via schemes would have been undertaken at a higher price or considered at all had 
they been required to be structured as takeover bids. Furthermore, the charge that schemes 
facilitate “regulatory arbitrage” in changes of control is difficult to sustain without providing 
motive for, and evidence of, target directors choosing to benefit themselves at the expense of 
their shareholders. Our study addresses this gap in the literature. 
Our analysis draws on a sample of 108 SOA and 155 friendly takeovers completed for 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) listed firms between 2000 and 2011.2  As takeover 
hostility is a key driver of target director turnover in acquisitions (Bugeja et al., 2009) we only 
include friendly takeovers in our analysis. We use this approach since SOA are by their nature 
friendly and we aim to make our comparison of deals as similar as possible in terms of target 
firm attitude to the deal. We analyse the incidence of target firm directors holding a board seat 
on the merged entity one, two and three years subsequent to the acquisition. Our results show 
target firm directors are significantly more likely to be appointed to the acquiring firm board 
in SOA than in takeovers. This result holds both at the individual director level and using the 
proportion of the target firm board appointed to the board of the combined firm. For instance, 
                                                          
1 In practice, it is likely that deal structure, premiums and director retention are determined simultaneously as 
part of negotiations between the bidder and target firm. As a result, we cannot conclusively show whether 
scheme use leads to director retention or alternatively the promise of director retention leads to the deal being 
structured as a scheme. In our robustness testing (see section 6.2) we conduct simultaneous equation analysis 
which indicates that whilst SOA use is significantly related to director retention, the reverse association is 
insignificant. 
2 A takeover is classified as friendly if the initial recommendation of the target firm board is that shareholders 
accept the offer. 
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whilst 16% of target directors sit on the board of the acquirer at the end of the first financial 
year after a successful takeover bid, 24% of target directors do so in a SOA. These results are 
robust to controlling for endogeneity arising from the choice of acquisition method. 
We also investigate if the proportion of the target firm directors appointed to the acquiring firm 
board is associated with better post- acquisition accounting and share market performance of 
the combined entity. We undertake this analysis because it could be argued that the higher rate 
of appointment of target directors in SOA is justified as it leads to higher subsequent 
performance. Our results conducted separately for the one, two and three years after the 
acquisition document no association between the performance of the merged entity and the 
appointment of target directors. The lack of a significant association between the appointment 
of target firm directors to the merged entity and post- merger performance holds for both SOA 
and takeover bids. These results indicate that the merged entity is no worse-off from appointing 
more target firm directors. 
Our paper’s principal contribution is to extend the results in Bugeja et al., (2016) and address 
the empirical question of whether target directors are more likely to be appointed to the 
merged entity’s board in SOA. Our results suggest directors in SOA trade-off a lower 
premium in return for being appointed to the board of the acquiring firm. From a legal and 
Australian policy perspective, the fiduciary obligations of directors to act in the best interest 
of the company make it questionable, at the very least, whether it is appropriate for a director 
to accept a seat on the merged entity as a condition for enabling a SOA.  
More generally our study also contributes to prior literature on the extent managers’ interests 
align with shareholders in contests for corporate control (Walkling and Long, 1984; Eddey and 
Casey, 1989; Henry, 2005). Much of this literature has focused on the shareholder wealth 
effects of managerial response to putative expressions of interest from potential acquirers. Our 
findings add to the evidence in Wulf (2004) and Qiu et al., (2014) who show that target CEO 
retention is associated with lower takeover premiums.  We document that the negative 
association between retention and premiums extends beyond the target firm CEO to other board 
members, and also influences the decision on how to structure the acquisition. 
Our study also contributes to prior research on the turnover of target firm directors’ post-
acquisition (Harford, 2003; Bugeja et al., 2009). Our results show target directors are more 
likely to be appointed to the acquiring firm’s board the higher their ownership in the target firm 
and the higher the number of other board seats they hold. In addition, we find that the takeover 
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premium is negatively associated with the likelihood that a target director receives a board 
appointment with the bidder, also consistent with directors acting in their own interest. Lower 
bidding firm performance and higher growth opportunities are also positively associated with 
the probability a target director is appointed to the acquiring firm board. 
Finally, this study also adds to prior literature which investigates the post- acquisition 
performance of the combined entity (Limmack, 1991, Agrawal et al., 1992, Gregory, 1997, 
Mitchell and Stafford, 2000, Moeller et al., 2005, Savor and Lu, 2009). This literature to date 
has not examined whether appointing target firm directors to the acquiring firm board improves 
takeover outcomes. For instance, it may be predicted that having the expertise of target firm 
directors on the board of the combined entity may assist the integration of the target firm into 
the group leading to higher performance. Our results however, indicate that there is no 
association between the appointment of target firm directors and the abnormal returns and 
accounting performance of the combined firm.3 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The Australian regulatory environment 
governing corporate control changes is discussed in more detail in Section 2. Section 3 
describes prior literature and outlines our main hypothesis, whilst Section 4 discusses our 
research method. Section 5 outlines our sample and provides descriptive statistics and Section 
6 discusses the results of our analysis. The final section of the paper provides a conclusion 
and suggestions for future research. 
2 Schemes of arrangement vs takeover bids: institutional arrangements 
In Australia, merger and acquisition transactions are regulated by the Corporations Act 2001. 
Schemes of arrangement allow a company to enter into a binding agreement with either their 
creditors or shareholders. Schemes that result in a transfer of corporate control require the 
reconstruction of a company’s share capital and are undertaken as either a cancellation 
scheme or a transfer scheme. Under a cancellation scheme all the shares not held by the 
bidding firm are cancelled with the result that the bidding firm becomes the sole owner. In 
contrast, under a transfer scheme the shareholders of the target firm sell their shares to the 
bidding firm. The end result under both types of scheme is identical: the bidding firm 
becomes entitled to 100% ownership of the target firm. 
                                                          
3 The evidence in Fich et al., 2016 shows that the retention of the target firm CEO does not benefit the acquiring firm. 
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The implementation of a SOA requires the approval of both the target shareholders and the 
approval of the court. The court is involved initially to approve the calling of a meeting of 
target shareholders to vote on the implementation of the scheme agreement between the 
target and bidding firm. The terms of the proposed scheme are detailed in the SOA 
documentation. This document is also reviewed by the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) which is permitted to make submissions to the Court on any issues of 
concern, or object to the approval of the scheme. If target shareholders vote in favour of 
scheme implementation the court is required to provide final approval before the SOA is 
given final effect. In practice, if shareholders approve a scheme it is unusual for ASIC to 
object or for the Court to withhold endorsement.4 
Takeovers are regulated by Chapter 6 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001 and do not 
require the involvement of the Court or ASIC. A takeover involves the bidding firm making 
an offer directly to target shareholders either on or off market. The Corporations Act requires 
both the bidder and target firm to provide a range of disclosures in documents sent to target 
firm shareholders and ASIC (i.e., a Bidder and Target statement). 
There are a number of key differences between schemes and takeovers. Firstly, SOA allow 
structural flexibility in arranging the transaction. For example, a scheme may involve a 
compromise negotiation position in which the terms favour either or both parties in order to 
reach a final settlement (Damian and Rich 2009). In addition, schemes can be structured to 
achieve multiple objectives in a single transaction. These may include for instance, splitting 
the assets of a company by demerging a division while transferring other parts of the 
organisation to an acquirer. As such, schemes are well suited to implementing complex 
mergers (Hughes 2003). In contrast, a takeover offer caters for basic takeover transactions 
(Damian & Rich 2009) involving a change of corporate control and are driven by the market 
price mechanism of supply and demand. 
Another key difference between SOA and takeovers is the different threshold requirements in 
offer acceptance that need to be reached for the bidding firm to obtain 100% control. In a 
SOA if 75% or more of target shareholders vote in favour of the scheme the bidding firm 
gains 100% control of the target firm. This ‘all or nothing’ approach is allegedly beneficial to 
                                                          
4 The discussion in CAMAC’s (2009) report on Members Schemes of Arrangement supports this observation.  
Pertinently, the CAMAC report notes “[o]n one judicial view, primary weight in a scheme should be given to 
those shareholders who vote on a proposal, as the apathetic shareholder who chooses not to vote upon a scheme 
should not be presumed to be antagonistic to the scheme or to warrant paternalistic protection” (p. 46). 
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bidders because it provides greater certainty in financing the acquisition (CAMAC, 2008). 
Furthermore, a SOA offers a specific date when the success or failure of the transaction will 
be known (i.e., the shareholder meeting date). This is in contrast to takeover bids where it is 
uncertain when (or if) offer acceptances reach 90% and compulsory acquisition may proceed. 
A further point of distinction between SOA and takeovers is that takeovers are subject to the 
so called “Eggleston Principles”, included in Chapter 6 of the Corporations Act 2001. These 
principles are designed to ensure that all target shareholders have a reasonable and equal 
opportunity to share in the benefits arising from the sale proceeds in the takeover (McConvill, 
2006). The Eggleston principles do not apply to schemes but it can be argued that target 
shareholders in schemes are protected by the involvement of the Court and ASIC, however, 
as noted earlier, the efficacy of this protection has been questioned, particularly in view of 
schemes being associated with lower premiums for control (e.g., FINSIA 2006). 
3. Prior literature and hypothesis development 
Schemes vs takeovers 
Bugeja et al., (2016) undertake an empirical investigation of what drives the choice between 
schemes and takeovers. Their results indicate that scheme use is positively associated with 
acquiring firm leverage and target firm size. These findings are consistent with bidding firms 
preferring the ‘all-or-nothing’ outcome associated with schemes as it provides them greater 
certainty in negotiating finance for the acquisition of larger target firms. Their evidence also 
indicates that SOA use is associated with target firm ownership structure. In particular, 
schemes are used more often when the acquiring firm has a lower toehold in the target. 
Additionally, target firms with fewer substantial shareholders are more likely to be acquired 
in schemes, consistent with reduced close monitoring making it more feasible for bidding 
firms to insert a wedge between the interest of target firm shareholders and directors.  
Bugeja et al., (2016) also find that schemes are associated with the payment of a significantly 
lower premium than takeovers. Their finding is robust to controlling for endogeneity using 
both a Heckman (1979) two-step procedure and adopting propensity score matching. That 
study however, does not address why target firm directors enable a change of control via a 
scheme at a premium lower than that obtained on average from a takeover bid. This study 
addresses the potential personal incentives directors have to agree to structure the deal as a 
SOA. 
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Motives for target director actions in takeovers 
Walkling and Long (1984) are among the first to note the substantial conflict of interest 
between shareholders and target firm directors in a takeover. Whilst directors have a fiduciary 
responsibility to recommend a takeover offer if it is in the best interest of their shareholders,5 
directors are likely to find they are unemployed if the takeover is successful. This tension 
motivates two competing hypotheses about the reaction of target firm directors and executive 
to a takeover offer: the shareholder welfare hypothesis and the managerial welfare 
hypothesis.  
Walkling and Long (1984) investigate manager’s resistance to takeover bids in a sample of 
U.S. takeovers and find contrary to the shareholder welfare hypothesis no association 
between takeover hostility and takeover premiums. Consistent with managerial self-interest 
being the primary driver of directors’ receptiveness to a takeover bid they find bid resistance 
is negatively related to the change in managerial wealth arising from the acquisition. They 
also report that managers of the target are more likely to be employed post- acquisition by the 
bidder in friendly takeovers. 
In Australia, Section 180 of the Corporations Act requires directors to exercise their powers 
and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person 
would exercise. Additionally, Section 182 states that a director must not improperly use their 
position to gain an advantage for themselves. Eddey and Casey (1989) test the shareholder 
and managerial welfare hypotheses using Australian data. In contrast to Walkling and Long 
(1984), they find a significant positive association between the takeover premium and the 
recommendation of takeover acceptance by the target firm board. In addition, the ownership 
of the target firm directors and the directors’ wealth change from the acquisition are not 
associated with the target board’s recommendation to shareholders. Maheswaran and Pinder 
(2005) also using Australian data find target firm hostility is not significantly associated with 
takeover premiums. They find larger firm size and lower firm growth increase the likelihood 
that the target firm board will recommend rejection of the takeover. 
                                                          
5 The Corporations Act (Section 181) requires directors to act in the company’s interest, which would seem to 
include more than the interests of shareholders. However, shareholders are clearly recognized as a key 
stakeholder in changes of corporate control as evidenced by the requirement for them to approve any SOA put 
to them by management. As such, directors have at least an implied duty not to act against the interests of 
shareholders. 
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Henry (2005) presents Australian findings which diverge from those reported in Eddey and 
Casey (1989). Consistent with Walkling and Long’s (1984) US findings, Henry reports that 
target director ownership and the potential wealth gain of directors are positively associated 
with an accept recommendation. A number of other studies also document that takeover 
hostility is associated with lower target firm director ownership (Shivdasani, 1993, Cotter and 
Zenner, 1994, Holl and Kyriazis, 1996 and O’Sullivan and Wong, 1998). Furthermore, Cotter 
et al., (1997) and O’Sullivan and Wong (1998) report that takeover resistance is not 
associated with target board independence. In summary, the weight of evidence on target 
board recommendations favours the proposition that target directors’ recommendations are 
positively associated with their potential wealth gain from the bid succeeding. 
It is commonly argued that one motivation for takeovers is to remove managers that are either 
underperforming or not otherwise acting in shareholders’ interest (e.g., Shliefer and Vishny 
1997). An implication of this conjecture is that target firm managers and directors lose their 
positions post- acquisition and this likelihood is greater in poorly performing firms. This 
expectation is consistent with the notion of ex-post settling-up discussed in Fama (1980), 
whereby target directors’ reputation and past performance in advancing shareholders’ 
interests affects their employment prospects subsequent to a successful takeover.  
Several studies have tested the expost settling up hypothesis by analysing the post- takeover 
employment of target firm CEOs. Using US data, Martin and McConnell (1991) and Kini et 
al., (2004) find there is a significant increase in the rate of turnover of target firm CEOs 
following a successful acquisition and that the rate of turnover is higher for poorly 
performing targets. Martin and McConnell (1991) however find takeover hostility does not 
make a difference to the rate of CEO turnover, whilst Kini et al., (2004) find takeover 
hostility increases the proportion of CEOs that are replaced.  
Hartzell et al., (2004) also find an increased rate of target firm CEO turnover post- 
acquisition in the US. Furthermore, consistent with CEOs acting in their own interest they 
find evidence that CEOs are willing to trade off a lower premium in return for being offered a 
position with the bidding firm post- takeover. Similar results are documented in Wulf (2004) 
and Qui et al., (2014).  Kennedy and Limmack (1996) examine CEO turnover after UK 
takeovers and find similar to the US that CEO turnover is greater for poorly performing 
targets. They also find that turnover is positively associated with takeover premiums but 
unrelated to takeover hostility. 
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Other studies have examined the turnover of target firm directors after a successful takeover. 
Harford (2003) documents that in US takeovers 19% of insiders and 10% of grey and other 
directors are appointed to the acquiring firm board after a successful takeover. He finds that 
inside directors are more likely to be appointed to the bidding firm board in friendly 
takeovers and when the target is performing well. These variables are however unrelated to 
outside director turnover. UK results reported in Franks and Mayer (1996) show 
that director turnover in successful takeovers is related to takeover hostility but unrelated to 
target firm performance. 
Australian evidence in Bugeja, et al., (2009) reveals that the vast majority of directors and 
CEOs are removed after a successful acquisition. The results show that director turnover is 
negatively related to target firm performance, the number of other directorships that a director 
holds and an indicator variable highlighting whether a director cross-sits on the board of the 
bidder. They find an insignificant association between the takeover premium and the 
likelihood of director turnover. 
Hypothesis development 
During the negotiation phase of a corporate acquisition there are many matters which need to 
be agreed upon between the acquiring and target firm management. These items include 
matters such as deal structure, offer price and the post- takeover employment opportunities 
for target firm directors within the merged entity. It is highly likely that during the course of 
these negotiations a number of trade-offs are agreed to between the two sets of parties. The 
evidence in Bugeja et al., (2016) indicates that SOA are associated with the payment of a 
significantly lower premium to target shareholders. The main research question addressed in 
this study, is whether as part of this bargaining process the target firm board agrees to 
structure the deal as a SOA and accept a lower premium in return for a private benefit (i.e., a 
future board seat). 
A number of prior studies present evidence consistent with the managerial welfare hypothesis 
and show that target firm CEOs trade-off premiums in return for a board seat post- 
acquisition (Wulf, 2004 and Qui et al., 2014). The Australian evidence in Bugeja, et al., 
(2009) however shows director appointments to the merged entity board are unrelated to 
takeover premiums.  That study however does not distinguish between SOA and takeovers.  
Given that schemes by their inherent nature require the cooperation of the target firm board 
they present target directors with much greater bargaining power over the bidding firm than 
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exists in a takeover.  It is plausible that directors seeking to advance their own self-interest 
(Hartzell et al., 2004) use this heightened bargaining position to secure post- deal 
employment opportunities on the merged entity board in return for agreeing to structure the 
deal as a scheme. For a bidding firm this may be a worthwhile trade-off as it reduces the 
threshold for success to 75% and lowers the consideration required to complete the 
acquisition. In contrast, in a takeover bid because the bidding firm is able to make an offer 
directly to shareholders irrespective of the support of the target firm board the negotiation 
power of target directors is reduced. 
As a counter argument, the shareholder welfare hypothesis argues that target directors in 
mergers act in the interest of their shareholders (Walkling and Long, 1984). Such a 
hypothesis predicts that acquisitions are negotiated as schemes to allow target shareholders to 
realise a premium that would otherwise not be forthcoming. As such, it would be expected 
that directors receive no private benefit from agreeing to structure the deal as a scheme and as 
a result the rate of appointment of directors to the merged entity board will be similar to that 
in takeovers. Given these conflicting predictions we do not state a formal hypothesis. 
It should be noted that in testing for an association between director appointments post- deal 
completion and acquisition structure we are unable to specify the direction of the causal 
relationship. Without being present at the private negotiations between the two parties it is 
not possible to determine if deal structure choice influences director retention or the promise 
of retention drives deal structure choice. In all likelihood there is a degree of causality in both 
directions.6 For the purpose of this study we contend that determining the exact direction of 
the association is less important than establishing whether there is evidence of an 
association.7 In particular, documenting an association would be consistent with the self-
dealing of target directors and would be of interest to target shareholders and corporate 
regulators. 
4. Research method  
Director-level 
                                                          
6 Similarly, it is not possible to determine if a lower premium influences director retention or the promise of a 
board seat leads to target directors accepting a lower premium. 
7 We attempt to address possible reverse causality in additional testing (section 6.1). 
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To test for an association between SOA and director retention we estimate the following logit 
regression model which includes controls for a number of director related characteristics. We 
also control for takeover premiums and target and bidder firm performance and growth.8 
 
ONBOARD = i + 1SOA + 2BDSIZE + 3EXECDUM + 4CEODUM + 5CHAIRDUM + 
6OTHBDSTS + 7CROSSIT + 8DIROWN + 9PREM30 + 10TROA + 11TMB + 
12RELSIZE + 13BROA + 14BMB + INDUSTRY + i      (1) 
 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable coded as one if an individual target director 
holds a seat on the acquiring firm board subsequent to the acquisition. This variable is 
measured alternatively at three points in time: the first (ONBOARDZERO), second 
(ONBOARDONE) and third financial years post- deal completion (ONBOARDTWO). The 
main variable of interest is an indicator variable denoting acquisitions which are structured as 
a scheme (SOA).  
We include a number of director-level corporate governance variables to control for the 
strength of a director’s bargaining position in negotiating a position on the acquiring firm 
board. The first three control variables indicate respectively whether a specific director is an 
executive (EXECDUM), managing director/CEO (CEO), or chairperson on the target firm 
board (CHAIRDUM). We predict that the appointment of a target director to the acquiring 
firm board is greater for executive directors and CEOs, as their expertise is potentially of 
higher value to the acquiring firm subsequent to the acquisition. Bugeja et al., (2009) 
however, find that CEO and executive directors of the target firm are no more likely to be 
appointed to the board of the bidding firm after a successful acquisition. It is also possible 
that the chairperson of the target firm board has greater bargaining power and this may 
influence their ability to negotiate a position on the acquiring firm board.  
Our next control is an indicator variable (CROSSIT) highlighting target firm directors who 
already hold a board seat with the acquiring firm. These directors are predicted to be more 
likely to retain their board seat after deal completion. Bugeja et al., (2009) find evidence 
consistent with this expectation. The results in Harford (2003) indicate that target directors 
that are blockholders are more likely to be appointed to the bidding firm board consistent 
with these directors having greater bargaining power. It is notable however, that Bugeja et al., 
                                                          
8 We control for premiums as we aim to examine if the effect of deal structure is additional to the influence of 
lower premiums on director retention. 
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(2009) find this variable insignificant in Australia. We control for each director’s ownership 
in the target firm using their individual percentage shareholding at the date of the takeover 
announcement (DIROWN). The next control is target firm board size (BDSIZE) at the date of 
the takeover announcement. As it is not practicably feasible for the acquiring firm to appoint 
all target firm directors to their board post- acquisition, a larger target firm board size reduces 
the likelihood that any specific director is appointed. 
We also include a variable to control for a director’s reputation and experience. This variable 
is a count of the other (i.e., non-target) board seats held by a director at the date of the 
takeover announcement on ASX listed firms (OTHBDSTS). It is predicted that directors with 
more board seats have an increased likelihood of being appointed to the acquiring firm board. 
The results in Bugeja et al., (2009) are partially consistent with this expectation. 
Alternatively, it may be argued that directors with a greater number of other board seats are 
already busy and are less likely to accept a board position on the merged entity.  
We control for the takeover premium because a greater premium suggests more possible 
efficiency improvements after the acquisition from removing poorly performing managers 
(Kennedy and Limmack, 1996). Furthermore, Hartzell, et al., (2004), report that target firm 
CEOs may negotiate a lower premium with bidders in return for being appointed to the 
acquiring firm board. The takeover premium is measured as the offer price less the target 
share price one month prior to the takeover announcement, divided by the target share price 
one month prior to the takeover announcement (PREM30).9 
We also include controls for target firm performance and growth options prior to the 
acquisition using respectively the target firm return on assets (TROA) and the market-to-book 
ratio (TMB). If directors of poorly performing targets are disciplined through a change in 
corporate control it is predicted that there is a positive association between target firm 
performance and the probability a director is appointed to the acquiring firm board (Fama, 
1980). Bugeja et al., (2009) using target firm pre- takeover abnormal returns as a measure of 
performance find results consistent with this expectation. We also include a control for the 
relative size of the target to the bidding firm (RELSIZE) measured using the market 
capitalisation of each firm three months before the takeover announcement. A larger relative 
size of the target to bidder firm increases the bargaining power of the target and is predicted 
to lead to a greater likelihood that a director is appointed to the acquiring firm board. In 
                                                          
9 Results are consistent if we estimate takeover premiums using the target firm share price either two months or 
15 days prior to the takeover announcement. 
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addition, the expertise of a target firm director is potentially more valuable where they have 
served on boards of larger firms (Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). 
Finally, we include controls in model (1) for bidder firm performance and growth 
opportunities. Similar to the target variables, we measure performance using return on assets 
for the year prior to the takeover announcement (BROA) and growth opportunities using the 
market-to-book ratio at the end of the financial year prior to the deal announcement (BMB). 
An acquiring firm which has greater growth opportunities possibly has a greater need to 
expand their board to include directors with additional experience and expertise. 
The model includes controls for industry fixed-effects through the inclusion of indicator 
variables for target firm two-digit GICS codes. In the interests of brevity the results on these 
variables are not reported. As this model is estimated at the director level each firm enters the 
regression multiple times. To control for potential serial correlation, standard errors are 
clustered by target firm and are also adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Firm level models 
To expand our testing we also estimate a firm-level model using a generalized linear model 
(GLM) which includes a number of revised corporate governance variables.10 This firm-level 
model is summarized as: 
 
PROP = i + 1SOA + 2BDSIZE + 3EXECRATIO + 4TOTOTHBDSTS + 
5TOTDIROWN + 6TOTCROSSIT + 7PREM30 + 8TROA + 9TMB + 10RELSIZE + 
11BIDROA + 12BIDMB + INDUSTRY + i        (2) 
 
The dependent variable is calculated as the proportion of the target firm board which holds a 
board seat on the acquiring firm (PROP). Model (2) is estimated for the first, second and 
third years after the completion of the acquisition. The main test variable remains the 
indicator variable noting acquisitions conducted as a SOA. 
The independent variables are similar to those included above, although we now re-specify 
these to be aggregate measures. For example, we include a variable which measures the 
proportion of the target firm board that are executive directors (EXECRATIO). Given the 
findings in Kini et al ., (1995), if boards dominated by insiders are less likely to discipline 
management, then the proportion of directors appointed to the bidding firm board may be 
                                                          
10 A GLM is used because the proportion of the target firm board which can be appointed to the bidding firm 
board is bounded at one and zero. The sensitivity of the results to the use of GLM is discussed below. 
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positively associated with board independence. We also recalculate our other variables to 
reflect: the total number of other board seats held by target firm directors (TOTOTHBDSTS); 
aggregate ownership of the target firm board (TOTDIROWN) and the total number of 
directors which cross-sit on the acquiring firm board (TOTCROSSIT). We expect these three 
control variables to be positively associated with the proportion of the target firm directors 
appointed to the acquiring firm board. The remaining variables in regression model (2) are 
consistent with those included in model (1). Model (2) continues to control for industry fixed-
effects through the use of two-digit industry codes of target firms. Standard errors are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
5. Sample and descriptive statistics 
We use the Connect 4 Mergers and Acquisitions database to identify all takeovers and SOA 
for ASX listed targets between 2000 and 2011. This search identified 910 acquisitions. To 
arrive at our final sample, we exclude 301 acquisitions that are not successful as target firm 
directors are highly unlikely to be appointed to the board of an unsuccessful bidder (Bugeja et 
al., 2009). We also remove 52 schemes which consisted of more complex transactions than a 
simple change of control.11 We then exclude 226 acquisitions in which the acquiring firm is 
not publicly listed in Australia as we are unable to readily obtain data on the identity of 
directors of these firms post- acquisition. As discussed earlier, since SOA are by definition 
friendly deals we exclude 38 hostile takeovers as directors are unlikely to be appointed to the 
merged entity subsequent to these deals (Bugeja et al., 2009). Finally, we exclude 30 
acquisitions which are missing the data necessary to estimate our regression models. This 
leaves us with a sample of 263 acquisitions. This sample construction process is summarised 
in Table 1. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 2 shows the breakdown of the sample between schemes and takeovers. 
. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
                                                          
11 For example, if a SOA also involves the “spin-off” of a subsidiary the deal is excluded from the sample. This 
ensures we are comparing similar transactions in takeovers and schemes. 
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Approximately 41% of the acquisitions are conducted through the use of a SOA. The 
percentage of acquisitions structured as schemes varies from a low of 18% in 2005 through to 
a high of 53% in 2007. Table 2 also presents details on the target firm market capitalisation 
by year partitioned by schemes and takeovers. It is noticeable that over 50% of deals by 
target firm market value are completed using SOA. Furthermore, there is an increasing trend 
towards the use of schemes in the second half of the sample period with over 70% of deals as 
measured by size being organised as SOA in 2006, 2007 and 2009. 
Table 3 provides details on the industry distribution of the sample (using the two-digit GICS 
code of the target firm) partitioned into SOA and takeovers. In the telecommunications and 
financial industries over half of deals are arranged as schemes. In contrast, there are no SOA 
in the utilities sector. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
The identity of the target and bidding firm directors at the date of the takeover announcement 
are obtained from the takeover and scheme documents lodged by the bidder and target firms 
with the ASX. We use the same documents to collect information on the offer price and the 
target and bidding firm director shareholdings at the date of the takeover announcement. The 
respective financial statements of the bidder and target firm are used to hand collect all 
required financial information to estimate the regression models.  
To identify whether target firm directors are appointed to the acquiring firm board we 
manually check the annual report for the first year of consolidation of the target firm into the 
acquiring firm financial statements. We repeat the same process for the subsequent two 
financial years. The DatAnalysis Premium database is used as the main source of financial 
statements. Information on other directorships on listed firms held by target firm directors are 
obtained by manually searching for each director’s name in the Connect 4 Boardroom 
database. Share prices needs to calculate market capitalisation and takeover premiums are 
obtained from the Core Research Database maintained by Sirca Limited. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the regression models are provided in Table 
4. The Table also presents the results of a t-test or Chi-square test for whether there is any 
statistically significant difference between the variables across schemes and takeovers. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE  
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The findings indicate that 19% of target firm directors hold a position on the acquiring firm 
board in the first year that the target is consolidated into the acquiring firm’s financial 
statements. As would be expected through director attrition, this percentage decreases to 17% 
and 14% in the second and third year after acquisition respectively. The percentage of 
directors that sit on the acquiring firm board is significantly higher in schemes for all three 
years after deal completion. As a basis of comparison, the percentage of directors that hold a 
board seat on both the acquiring and target firm at the date of the takeover is 15% for both 
schemes and takeovers (CROSSIT). A similar conclusion is reached when comparing the 
proportion of the target firm board which hold a seat on the acquiring firm board post- 
acquisition. The average percentage is respectively 20%, 18% and 15% in the three years 
commencing from the first year of consolidation. Once more, this percentage is significantly 
higher in schemes of arrangement when compared with takeovers. 
Turning to the control variables, the level of target board ownership is relatively low with 
each director on average owning 3% of shares. The mean number of other board seats is just 
below one, although it is notable that the median number of other board seats is zero. The 
average target firm board size is 5.6 directors, with targets involved in schemes having a 
statistically larger board than targets involved in takeovers. This is likely driven by target 
firms in schemes being larger in size that those being acquired using a takeover Bugeja et al., 
(2016). There is no statistical difference between schemes and takeovers for the remaining 
governance variables. 
Similar to earlier studies we find that target shareholders receive substantial bid premiums 
(Bugeja and Walter, 1995, Bugeja, 2005, Chapple et al., 2007). However, consistent with the 
results in Bugeja et al., (2016) takeover premiums in SOA (17%) are significantly lower than 
those in takeovers (33%). The mean target firm return on assets is negative, whilst the 
average acquiring firm return on assets is positive suggesting acquiring firms are performing 
better than acquired firms. A comparison between schemes and takeovers indicates that there 
are no statistical differences for either acquiring firm return on assets or market-to-book 
ratios. 
Table 5 presents a Pearson correlation matrix for the non-binary variables included in the 
regression models. Panel A presents correlations for director level variables, whilst the results 
in Panel B show the firm level correlations. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE  
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The findings in Panel B show that the proportion of the target firm board which obtain board 
seats with the acquiring firm is positively associated with the total number of other board 
seats held by target firm directors and the total number of directors that cross-sit on the 
acquiring firm board. Total director ownership is positively correlated to the proportion of the 
board retained in the second and third years subsequent to deal completion. There is a 
significant negative correlation between the proportion of the board retained and: the 
takeover premium and bidding firm performance. The negative correlation between takeover 
premiums and target director appointment on the acquiring firm board is consistent with 
directors acting in their own self-interest. The correlation between the independent variables 
included in the regression analysis are below levels (0.60) which would cause 
multicollinearity concerns with the estimation of the models (Gujarati, 1995). 
6. Results and additional testing 
6.1 Main results 
SOA and takeover premiums 
Prior to presenting the results of our main analysis we estimate an OLS regression model to 
assess the association between takeover premiums and SOA. The variables included in this 
model are identical to those used in Bugeja et al., (2016).12 The results of this regression are 
presented in the first set of columns in Table 6. Similar to the findings in Bugeja et al., (2016) 
we find takeover premiums are significantly lower in SOA.  To extend this analysis we 
estimate the regression with the inclusion of PROPZERO as an additional test variable, and 
the interaction of this variable with SOA (PROPZERO*SOA).  The results of this analysis are 
reported in the second column of Table 6.  The results on both SOA and PROPZERO are 
statistically insignificant indicating that board appointments and SOA separately are 
unrelated to takeover premiums.  Importantly, the interaction term between 
SOA*PROPZERO is negative and significant suggesting that lower premiums are received in 
SOAs when a greater proportion of the target firm board holds a board seat on the merged 
entity post- acquisition. 
                                                          
12 As our sample is restricted to friendly takeovers we replicate the friendly takeover only analysis in Bugeja et 
al., (2016). The model of takeover premiums includes controls for: method of payment (PAYT); competing 
bidders (MULT); acquiring firm toehold (TOEHOLD); target and bidder firm leverage (TDE and BDE); target 
and bidding firm free cash flow (TFCF and BFCF); target and bidding firm size (TSIZE and BSIZE); and 
bidding firm aggregate percentage board ownership (BOWN). These variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
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INSERT TABLE 6 HERE  
A possible concern with these regression results is the issue of endogeneity and more 
specifically selection bias. Selection bias occurs because choices made by firms (e.g., 
acquisition type) do not occur randomly (Tucker, 2010; Lennox et al., 2012). The main 
methods for dealing with self-selection bias are the use of propensity score matching or the 
Heckman (1979) two–stage method.13 To address if the takeover premium results are 
sensitive to controlling for self-selection we employ both approaches. We first estimate a 
probit regression model where the dependent variable is an indicator variable for acquisitions 
structured as a SOA. The variables employed in this model are similar to that used in Bugeja 
et al., (2016).14 The results of estimating this probit model are presented in Table 7. The 
findings of this model are similar to those reported in Bugeja et al., (2016) except bidder 
leverage is insignificant. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE  
Using the results from this probit model we create a propensity-score matched sample by 
matching for each sample firm using a SOA, one control firm that does not structure their bid 
as an SOA but has the closest predicted probability of using a SOA. The results from 
estimating our OLS premium regression for this matched sample are presented in the last two 
columns of Table 6 and provide results consistent with the original findings.  We also use the 
probit results to calculate the inverse-Mills ratio (MILLS) and re-estimate our regression 
including this additional variable as a control for selection bias. The results of this analysis 
(not tabulated) are consistent with the results presented.15  
Board retention at the director level 
                                                          
13 A more detailed discussion of the issues associated with the use of the Heckman (1979) method and 
propensity score matching is provided in Tucker, (2010) and Lennox et al., (2012). 
14 Amongst a number of different ownership concentration measures Bugeja et al., (2016) find that only the 
number of substantial shareholders significantly influences the likelihood of a scheme. As such, we include that 
variable (TSUBSHNO) in our probit model. 
15 In additional testing we examine if the association between board retention and takeover premiums is 
conditional on board experience and payment method. To test this association we include an interaction variable 
between PROPZERO and respectively PAYT and TOTOTHBDSTS in the model. The results on these interaction 
terms are insignificant.  We also test if industry relatedness of the target and bidder firms moderates the 
association between board retention and takeover premiums. We first construct an indicator variable 
(SAMEIND) if the target and bidder are in the same two-digit GICS code.  This variable is then interacted with 
PROPZERO and our takeover premium model re-estimated.  The coefficient on both SAMEIND and the 
interaction variable SAMEIND*PROPZERO are insignificant. Importantly, the coefficient on SOA*PROPZERO 
remain negative and significant in this additional testing. 
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Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of estimating regression model (1) for the full sample, 
whilst Panel B presents the results for the propensity score-matched sample to control for 
endogeneity. This regression is estimated at the director level and tests the likelihood that an 
individual director holds a board seat on the acquiring firm board for each of the three years 
subsequent to the acquisition. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE  
The Wald Chi-squared statistic indicates that the regression model is significant and the 
pseudo R-squared highlights that the model has reasonable explanatory power. For both the 
full and propensity score-matched samples the results indicate that directors in schemes are 
significantly more likely to hold a position on the acquiring firm board for the first and 
second years after the completion of the deal.  To assess the economic significance of our 
findings we calculate the marginal effect on the probability of a director being appointed to 
the acquiring firm board in the first year after the acquisition. This analysis indicates that in a 
SOA a director is 7% or 6% more likely to be appointed to the merged board for the full 
sample and propensity score matched sample respectively. 
An examination of the control variables indicates that directors that cross-sit prior to the 
announcement of the deal are more likely to retain their position after deal completion. The 
findings also indicate that directors that hold a greater number of non-target board seats are 
more likely to be appointed to the acquiring firm board. This result likely reflects the greater 
experience and expertise of these directors. Consistent with greater bargaining power we also 
document that directors with a higher personal ownership in the target firm are more likely to 
achieve a board appointment. We find no association between the likelihood of being 
appointed to the acquiring firm board and the status of the target firm director (i.e., CEO, 
chairperson or executive). 
Interestingly, the findings show a significant negative relationship between takeover 
premiums and the likelihood a director holds a board seat with the acquiring firm in the first 
year after deal completion. This suggests that where target directors are able to extract a 
higher premium for their shareholders they are likely to be penalised by not being offered a 
seat on the board of the acquiring firm. Table 8 reports that target firm growth and 
performance and the relative size of the acquisition are insignificant. In contrast, the 
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acquiring firm is less likely to appoint target directors when they are better performing and 
are more likely to appoint target directors when they have higher growth opportunities.16 
Board retention at the firm level 
Table 9 presents the results of estimating generalised linear model (2) at the firm level. 
Similar to above, the model is estimated for each of the three years’ post- acquisition. Panel 
A presents the results for the full sample, whilst Panel B presents the results for the 
propensity score matched sample. 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE  
Consistent with the results estimated at the director level, our findings for both the full 
sample and propensity score matched sample indicate that a greater proportion of the target 
firm board is likely to be appointed to the board of the bidder in SOA.17  This effect occurs 
for each of the three years after the acquisition. The results on the governance and other 
control variables are largely consistent with those reported at the director level.18 For 
example, we find that the proportion of the board retained is positively related to the total 
number of directors that cross-sit on the acquiring firm board and the total number of other 
directorships held be target firm directors. Interestingly, whilst individual director ownership 
explains board retention this result does not hold using total director ownership. As expected 
a larger target firm board reduces the proportion of target directors that are appointed to the 
board of the merged entity.19 
6.2 Additional analysis and robustness testing 
Reverse causality 
                                                          
16 A modified version of model (1) which includes only target firm corporate governance variables as controls 
provides consistent results to those shown in Table 8. 
17 For the firm level analysis we also employ a Heckman (1979) two-stage approach using the findings in Table 
7 as the first-step to calculate the inverse Mills ratio and OLS regression for the second stage. We acknowledge 
that the second stage regression is potentially mis-specified due to the use of the proportion as the dependent 
variable. The results from this testing (untabulated) are largely consistent with those presented in Table 9 with 
SOA being significantly positively associated with the proportion of the target firm board in each of the three 
years after the acquisition. 
18 In additional testing, we include in the estimation of models (1) and (2) an indicator variable denoting 
takeovers in which cash is used exclusively as the method of payment. The inclusion of this variable does not 
change the conclusions from our analysis. The method of payment variable is significant and negatively related 
to target direct appointment on the acquiring firm board for the first and second years after the acquisition. 
19 In unreported analysis we construct our propensity score matched sample using only the results of a probit 
regression comprising the significant variables reported in Table 7. The conclusions from estimating models (1) 
and (2) for this alternative sample are unchanged from those presented. 
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A potential concern with our findings is the possibility of reverse causality since the choice to 
structure a deal as a SOA may be driven by target director retention rather than the effect 
occurring in the opposite direction. Although, we contend that a regulatory concern of 
director self-dealing exists irrespective of the precise direction of the relationship, we test for 
the possibility for reverse causality using a three-stage simultaneous equations framework. 
The systems of models we estimate include model (2) and the probit model used to predict 
SOA shown in Table 7.  In the model predicting SOA we include PROPZERO as an 
additional endogenous explanatory variable. The results are reported in Table 10.  
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE 
The findings show that PROPZERO has a positive but insignificant coefficient in explaining 
the choice to structure a deal as a SOA.  In contrast, SOA has a positive and significant 
association with the proportion of directors on the merged entity board.  Overall, these results 
are consistent with deal structure significantly influencing the decision to appoint directors to 
the merged firm board rather than this association occurring in the reverse direction. 
Use of a linear probability model for director level analysis 
The director level analysis is estimated using a logit regression. As a robustness check we re-
estimate the model using a linear probability model (LPM). The significance of the SOA 
variable when estimating the model using LPM (not tabulated) is increased in comparison to 
the results shown in Table 8. Specifically, the SOA variable is positive and significant for 
each of the three years post acquisition at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively 
commencing from the first year after deal completion. 
OLS and tobit models for firm level analysis 
Although a GLM is appropriate when the dependent variable is a proportion we assess 
whether our results at the firm level are robust to using both OLS regression and a Tobit 
model. These findings (not tabulated) continue to indicate that the proportion of directors 
retained on the acquiring firm board is significantly greater in SOA for the three years’ post- 
acquisition. The conclusions from the findings on the control variables are also largely 
unchanged, although the coefficient on total target firm board ownership is positive and 
significant using the Tobit model. 
Schemes and takeover competition 
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The results in Bugeja et al., (2016) document lower premiums in SOA.  Although, not the 
primary focus of this study it is possible that lower premiums in SOA are driven by less 
competition for target firms in SOA.  This conclusion would be consistent with earlier 
research (Varaiya, 1987 and Gilberto and Varaiya, 1989) which documents takeover 
competition is positively associated with offer premiums.  To empirically test whether there 
is less competition for target firms in SOA we estimate a multivariate logit regression model 
with the dependent variable coded as one if there is more than one simultaneous bidder for a 
target firm and zero otherwise.20  This analysis is conducted for both the full sample and 
propensity score matched sample. The results of this model (not tabulated) provide a negative 
but insignificant coefficient on SOA inconsistent with there being a different rate of 
competition across deal type. 
Influence of cross-sitting directors  
Our results indicate that directors that cross-sit on the target and bidder board pre-acquisition 
are more likely to retain their board seat after deal completion.  To examine if this positive 
association only exists for SOAs we partition our sample by deal type and estimate regression 
models (1) and (2) separately for each group.  The results of this analysis (not tabulated) 
show a positive and significant association between director retention and CROSSSIT for both 
SOAs and takeovers at both the firm and director level. 
Attitude of the target firm board 
As described above our analysis is conducted using SOA and friendly takeover bids. We 
adopt this approach since SOA are by definition friendly and we aim to make our comparison 
of deals as similar as possible in terms of target firm attitude. To determine if the results 
presented are sensitive to inclusion of both hostile and friendly takeover bids we re-estimate 
our tests with the inclusion of both hostile and friendly takeover bids.21  The conclusions 
from this additional testing are consistent with the results presented and document a higher 
rate of director appointment to the merged entity board in SOA. 
                                                          
20 The control variables included in this model are: method of payment (PAYT); acquiring firm toehold 
(TOEHOLD); target and bidder firm leverage (TDE and BDE); target and bidding firm free cash flow (TFCF 
and BFCF); target and bidding firm size (TSIZE and BSIZE); target and bidding return on assets (TROA and 
BROA); target and bidding firm market to book ratio (TMB and BMB); takeover premium (PREM30); an 
indicator variable denoting a break-fee payable by the target firm (BFEE) and bidding firm aggregate percentage 
board ownership (BOWN). 
21 Takeover attitude is determined using the initial recommendation of target firm directors, with takeovers 
classified as friendly if the original recommendation is takeover acceptance.  
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Post-acquisition performance of the combined firm and director appointments 
Our findings indicate that SOA are associated with a higher rate of target director appointments 
to the board of the merged entity. Arguably a possible justification for the higher rate of 
appointment of target firm directors in SOA is that there is an additional need for their expertise 
and experience post-merger compared with takeovers.22 If this is the case, it would be predicted 
that the performance of the merged entity after the acquisition would be positively associated 
with the proportion of the target directors appointed to the acquiring firm board. To test this 
assertion we estimate the following OLS regression model: 
BHAR = i + 1PROPZERO + 2SOA + 3SOA*PROPZERO + 4PREM30 + 5PAYT + 
6MULT + 7RELSIZE + 8TROA + 9TMB + 10BFCF + 11BROA + 12BDE + 13BMB + 
14BOWN + INDUSTRY + YEAR + i       (3) 
The dependent variable is measured alternatively as the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
over the one (1YR), two (2YR) and three years (3YR) commencing six months after the takeover 
announcement. We use two alternative reference groups to calculate abnormal returns. The first 
method (i.e., industry-adjusted) is a variation of the model proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997) 
and matches each sample firm with a control firm within the same industry (using 2-digit GICS 
codes). The control firm chosen is that with the closest market capitalisation six months after 
the takeover announcement. The second method (i.e., size-adjusted) follows the approach of 
Brown and da Silva Rosa (1998). All acquiring firms are matched with a portfolio of control 
firms using the same size decile based on market capitalisation six months after the takeover 
announcement. Average returns for this control portfolio are then used to calculate abnormal 
returns. Only firms that survive over the entire measurement period are used within this control 
portfolio.23 
The main test variables used in regression model (3) are the SOA indicator variable (SOA), the 
proportion of the target firm board holding a board seat on the combined group at the end of 
the first financial year after the takeover (PROPZERO) and an interaction term between these 
two variables (SOA*PROPZERO). We add indicator variable controls for whether there are 
                                                          
22 We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion. Whilst there is no prima facie 
theoretical reason to expect directors’ expertise is more valuable in SOAs, we further investigate this conjecture 
as it provides an alternative explanation to self-dealing for the higher rate of target director board appointments 
in SOA. 
23 The median size adjusted BHARs are respectively: -19% (1 year) -47% (2 years) and –74% (3 years). The 
median industry adjusted BHARs are respectively: -2% (1 year) -9% (2 years) and –20% (3 years). For both 
measures of BHARs the median is significantly higher for SOA only in the first year after the acquisition.  
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multiple simultaneous bids for the target firm (MULT) and whether the payment method used 
in the acquisition is exclusively cash (PAYT). Prior research has generally documented poor 
performance of acquirer firms after an acquisition (Limmack, 1991, Agrawal et al., 1992, 
Gregory, 1997, Mitchell and Stafford, 2000, Moeller et al ., 2005) with the greatest 
underperformance being exhibited for acquirers offering stock as payment (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003, Dong et al.,, 2006, Savor and Lu, 2009). We also control for the ownership of 
the acquiring firm board at the date of the takeover announcement (BOWN) as bidding firms 
with low ownership may make poorer acquisitions due to agency problems. The remaining 
control variables included in model (3) are as previously defined. 
The findings (untabulated) show that there is no association between post-acquisition BHARs 
and the proportion of the target firm board appointed to the board of the merged group. 
Although, SOA have significantly higher returns in the one-year subsequent to the 
acquisition,24 this result does not differ if a greater percentage of the target firm directors 
receive a board appointment on the merged entity as the coefficient on the interaction term 
SOA*PROPZERO is insignificant.25 This superior returns in SOA is possibly driven by the 
better target firm performance in schemes prior to the bid documented in Table 4. The results 
on the control variables are largely insignificant and often provide inconsistent conclusions 
between the two reference samples used to calculate BHARs. There is limited evidence that 
returns are positively associated with premiums, cash payment and target firm performance. 
The results suggest growth acquirers (BMB) have higher post-acquisition performance which 
runs counter to the results in Rau and Vermaelen (1998). 2627 
As an additional test, we redefine the dependent variable in model (3) as the change in 
bidding firm ROA from the year prior to the acquisition to alternatively the first, second and 
third year of target firm consolidation. The results of this analysis (not tabulated) show no 
significant association between the change in accounting performance post- acquisition and 
the proportion of the target firm directors appointed to the acquiring firm board. Although, 
                                                          
24 SOA also have significantly higher returns in the second year using industry-adjusted returns. 
25 We also estimate model (3) using the propensity score matched sample. The findings for this reduced sample 
also show no association between the appointment of target firm directors and the performance of the merged 
group after the acquisition and the interaction term remains insignificant. 
26 We also estimate model (3) using the proportion of target directors on the board of the merged group one and 
two years after the acquisition.  This analysis continues to show no association between post-acquisition 
performance and the proportion of target directors who receive board seats on the acquiring firm.  
27 The conclusions from our findings are similar if we control for self-selection using the Heckman (1979) 
procedure.  
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SOA have significantly higher ROA in the first year after acquisition this is not associated 
with the percentage of directors appointed to the board.28 
We acknowledge that there is a possible alternative explanation for our insignificant findings 
on the association between post- acquisition performance and director retention. It is 
conceivable that SOA would have performed worse than takeovers in the absence of the 
higher rate of director appointments and it is the individual expertise and experience of the 
directors appointed in SOA which results in their performance being indistinguishable. This 
alternative explanation is difficult to rule out without defining the specific types of expertise 
which are more likely to be valuable in SOA and we leave this analysis to future research. To 
partially address these concerns however, we firstly restrict our analysis to schemes and 
assess if performance is related to the proportion of directors appointed to the acquiring firm 
board. The results of this analysis (not tabulated) continue to find no association between 
board appointments and performance. Secondly, we include as an additional control variable 
in our original post-acquisition performance analysis the number of other directorships held 
by the appointed directors. This additional variable should partially control for the appointed 
directors reputation and experience. The conclusions from our results are robust to the 
inclusion of the new variable as the interaction term between schemes and board 
appointments remains insignificant. Furthermore, the coefficient on this additional variable is 
largely insignificant.29 
7. Conclusions 
The Australian Corporations Act, 2001 allows firms to structure a change in corporate control 
as either a competitive takeover bid or as a scheme of arrangement. In more recent times, SOA 
have increasingly been used to acquire publicly listed targets. Due to differences in the 
threshold required to achieve full ownership of the target firm, SOA have been subject to public 
criticism that they disadvantage target firm shareholders through the payment of lower takeover 
premiums. Recent empirical evidence in Bugeja et al., (2016) is consistent with these 
criticisms. This study extends the findings in that paper to assess why target directors are 
                                                          
28 In additional testing we use industry-adjusted ROA (using two digit bidder GICS) and find similar results. 
The results are also unchanged using the propensity-score matched sample and the Heckman (1979) two-step 
approach. 
29 The only exception to this finding is a significant positive coefficient on the number of other board seats of 
appointed directors using the three year size adjusted abnormal returns. 
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motivated to structure a deal as a SOA which results in their shareholders receiving a lower 
premium. 
Our findings suggest that target firm directors facilitate a SOA in return for a board seat post- 
acquisition.  Whilst, target shareholders in SOA still receive significant premiums they are 
likely to be concerned with the possibility that target directors receive a private benefit for 
agreeing to the transaction. Our results are robust to controlling for endogeneity and reverse 
causality and indicate that the appointment of target firm directors to the board of the combined 
entity does not improve or worsen post- acquisition performance. Consistent with target 
directors acting in their self-interest we also find a negative association between takeover 
premiums and the likelihood of a director receiving a board seat with the acquiring firm. Target 
firm director appointments to the board of the acquiring firm board are also found to be 
positively associated with director expertise acquired from positions on other boards.  
We acknowledge that a weakness in our analysis is that premiums, deal type and director 
retention are likely to be determined simultaneously during negotiations between the bidder 
and target firm. Thus whilst out study can document an association we are unable to be 
definitive as to causality in any specific direction. Despite this weakness the findings in this 
study are likely to be of interest to regulators in any future review of Australia’s Corporations 
Act and in particular the mechanisms for undertaking a change in corporate control. 
Future research can study in more detail other differences between takeover and schemes. 
Furthermore, it may be worthwhile repeating the analysis in this study in other jurisdictions 
that provide target and bidder firms a choice in acquisition structure to determine if directors 
are willing to trade-off shareholders’ interests for their own. An additional area for future 
research is to further investigate the association between specific types of director expertise 
and director retention post- acquisition and their influence on merged entity performance. 
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Table 1 Sample Construction 
Deals announced between 2000 and 2011 on the Connect 4 Mergers and 
Acquisitions database  910 
Exclusions:   
Deals not completed 301  
Takeovers where the initial recommendation was rejection 38  
Schemes which involve more complex transactions than control change 52  
Acquiring firms which are not publicly listed 226  
Firms with missing data needed to estimate the regression model 30 (647) 
Total sample size to estimate regression model (2)  263 
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Table 2: Distribution of schemes and takeovers included in the sample 
Year Takeover
s 
No. 
Scheme
s 
No. 
Tota
l 
% of 
no. in 
scheme
s 
Takeover
s 
Mkt cap 
$’m 
Scheme
s 
Mkt cap 
$’m 
Total 
Mkt 
cap 
$’m 
% of 
Mkt cap 
in 
scheme
s 
200
0 
13 14 27 52% 6,862 8,758 15,621 56% 
200
1 
17 12 29 41% 4,091 3,431 7,522 46% 
200
2 
9 7 16 44% 208 2,084 2,293 91% 
200
3 
9 4 13 31% 4,472 1,906 6,377 30% 
200
4 
10 11 21 52% 2,375 4,441 6,816 65% 
200
5 
14 3 17 18% 12,950 2,881 15,831 18% 
200
6 
22 12 34 35% 3,097 11,783 14,880 79% 
200
7 
15 17 32 53% 3,008 18,923 21,931 86% 
200
8 
11 9 20 45% 10,319 20,875 31,194 67% 
200
9 
11 10 21 48% 275 817 1,092 75% 
201
0 
11 5 16 31% 2,732 1,223 3,955 31% 
201
1 
13 4 17 24% 1,308 2,016 3,324 61% 
 
155 108 263 41% 51,698 79,139 130,83
7 
60% 
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Table 3: Industry Distribution of the Sample 
GICS Industry Sector 
GICS 
Industry 
Code 
Takeover SOA Total 
SOA 
Percentage 
Energy 10 13 7 20 35% 
Materials 15 45 27 72 38% 
Industrials 20 14 6 20 30% 
Consumer Discretionary 25 26 8 34 24% 
Consumer Staples 30 6 5 11 45% 
Health Care 35 8 7 15 47% 
Financials 40 24 38 62 61% 
Information Technology 45 12 6 18 33% 
Telecommunication Services 50 4 4 8 50% 
Utilities 55 3 0 3 0% 
Total 
 
155 108 263 41% 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the variables included in the model determining the 
choice of deal type 
Variable N Mean Median 
Mean-  
SOA 
Mean - 
Takeover 
Stat 
Diff 
Director-level       
ONBOARDZERO 1,463 0.19 0.00 0.24 0.16 4.03*** 
ONBOARDONE 1,463 0.17 0.00 0.21 0.13 4.06*** 
ONBOARDTWO 1,463 0.14 0.00 0.17 0.12 2.54** 
EXECDUM 1,463 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.22 -0.64 
CEODUM 1,463 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.13 -1.37 
CHAIRDUM 1,463 0.17 0.00 0.15 0.18 -1.47 
OTHBDSTS 1,463 0.92 0.00 0.92 0.91 0.20 
DIROWN 1,463 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.29 
CROSSIT 1,463 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.13 
Firm level       
PROPZERO 263 0.20 0.00 0.25 0.17 2.20** 
PROPONE 263 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.14 2.25** 
PROPTWO 263 0.15 0.00 0.19 0.13 1.74* 
BDSIZE 263 5.56 5.00 6.06 5.21 3.85*** 
EXECRATIO 263 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.22 -0.01 
TOTOTHBDSTS 263 5.09 4.00 5.59 4.74 1.56 
TOTDIROWN 263 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.14 0.31 
TOTCROSSIT 263 0.86 0.00 0.93 0.82 0.44 
PREM30 263 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.33 -
3.89*** 
TROA 263 -0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.12 1.69* 
TMB 263 2.33 1.45 2.33 2.32 0.03 
RELSIZE 263 1.84 0.23 3.83 0.46 1.15 
BROA 263 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.10 
BMB 263 7.61 1.87 3.55 10.44 -0.93 
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. Stat diff is a t-test for continuous 
and Chi2-test for binary variables. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the non-binary variables included in the regression models 
 
Panel A: 
Director 
level 
OTHBDSTS DIROWN 
 
BDSIZE 
OTHBDSTS 1   
DIROWN -0.01 1  
BDSIZE 0.02 -0.09 1 
Correlations that are significant at 10% or lower are denoted in bold text. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 Pearson Correlation Matrix for the non-binary variables included in the regression models – continued 
 
Panel B: 
Firm level 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. PROPZERO 1              
2. PROPONE 0.88 1             
3. PROPTWO 0.83 0.93 1            
4. BDSIZE -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 1           
5. EXECRATIO -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 1          
6. TOTOTHBDSTS 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.42 -0.10 1         
7. TOTDIROWN 0.09 0.12 0.12 -0.03 0.06 -0.11 1        
8. TOTCROSSIT 0.46 0.49 0.42 0.22 -0.07 0.26 0.07 1       
9. PREM30 -0.16 -0.15 -0.12 -0.13 0.08 -0.11 0.01 -0.09 1      
10. TROA -0.00 -0.00 -0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 1     
11 TMB -0.07 -0.07 -0.03 0.08 0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.13 -0.14 1    
12 RELSIZE -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.08 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.01 1   
13 BROA -0.18 -0.15 -0.14 0.07 -0.00 0.02 -0.13 0.04 -0.00 0.03 0.05 0.01 1  
14 BMB -0.17 0.18 0.20 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.10 -0.20 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 1 
Correlations that are significant at 10% or lower are denoted in bold text. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 6  
OLS regression testing the association between takeover premiums and deal type 
This table presents the results of an OLS regression examining if schemes of arrangement are 
associated with lower takeover premiums. The dependent variable is the takeover premium calculated 
as the offer price minus the target share price one month before the takeover announcement. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  OLS  OLS  
 PROPENSITY 
MATCHED  
PROPENSITY 
MATCHED 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.75 3.21*** 0.64 2.34*** 0.40 1.43 0.11 0.36 
SOA -0.08 -1.86* 0.00 0.08 -0.08 -1.76* 0.06 0.85 
PROPZERO - - 0.02 0.15 - - 0.06 0.46 
PROPZERO*S
OA - - -0.29 -1.89* - - -0.33 -1.98** 
PAYT -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.25 -0.01 -0.18 0.02 0.38 
MULT -0.00 -0.05 -0.03 -0.44 0.02 0.36 -0.00 -0.01 
TOEHOLD 0.12 1.11 0.23 1.51 0.40 1.14 0.84 1.87* 
TOTDIROWN 0.04 0.83 0.10 1.64 0.00 0.08 0.08 1.05 
TROA 0.02 0.83 0.04 1.27 -0.01 -0.64 0.02 0.83 
TMB 0.01 2.62** 0.01 1.68* -0.01 -0.05 0.00 0.06 
TDE 0.00 1.47 0.01 1.34 0.01 1.41 0.01 1.61 
TFCF -0.13 -1.52 0.10 0.83 -0.13 -1.54 0.08 0.65 
TSIZE -0.07 -4.44*** -0.09 -4.89*** -0.05 -3.23*** -0.07 -3.47*** 
BROA 0.12 1.19 0.02 0.12 0.22 1.93* 0.09 0.60 
BMB -0.00 -6.75*** -0.00 -4.71*** -0.00 -0.42 0.00 0.72 
BDE 0.00 1.23 0.00 1.07 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.26 
BFCF -0.10 -0.56 -0.12 -0.54 -0.36 -1.70* -0.26 -1.03 
BSIZE 0.04 3.30*** 0.06 4.06*** 0.04 2.94*** 0.06 3.57*** 
BOWN -0.20 -1.78* -0.18 -1.21 -0.21 -1.57 -0.17 -0.89 
N 263  263  216 - 216  
Year fixed 
effects Y  Y  Y  Y  
Industry fixed 
effects Y  Y  Y  Y  
F-stat 22.43***  7.25***  2.73**  3.27***  
R-squared 0.34  0.37  0.33  0.36  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
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Table 7 
Probit model of the choice of deal type 
The table reports the results of a probit regression examining factors which influence the choice of whether 
to structure an acquisition as a SOA or takeover bid.  The dependent variable is an indicator variable coded 
as one when the acquisition is a scheme. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 Coefficient z-stat 
Intercept -1.94 -1.64 
TOEHOLD 
-8.13 
-
4.43*** 
TSUBSHNO -0.13 -2.21** 
TOTDIROWN 0.19 0.67 
TROA 0.09 0.74 
TMB -0.01 -0.41 
TDE -0.04 -1.55 
TFCF -0.38 -0.95 
TSIZE 0.20 2.90*** 
BROA 0.32 0.57 
BMB -0.00 -0.23 
BDE 0.04 1.33 
BFCF 0.12 0.14 
BSIZE -0.05 -0.89 
N 263  
Pseudo R2 0.35  
Year  
fixed effects 
Y  
Industry 
fixed effects 
Y  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 
Logit regression testing the likelihood a director has a board seat on the acquiring firm board  
This table presents the results of a logit regression predicting the likelihood that an individual target 
firm director will hold a board seat on the acquiring firm board. The dependent variable is measured 
using alternatively the director information for the first (ONBOARDZERO), second (ONBOARDONE) 
and third years (ONBOARDTWO) the target firm is consolidated into the acquiring firm financial 
statements after a successful acquisition. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A ONBOARDZERO  ONBOARDONE  ONBOARDTWO  
Full sample Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat 
Intercept -1.97 -2.82*** -2.97 -2.61** -3.12 -3.52*** 
SOA 0.63 2.34** 0.50 1.71* 0.30 1.07 
BDSIZE -0.06 -0.77 -0.02 -0.27 -0.09 -1.44 
EXECDUM -0.30 -1.04 -0.13 -0.48 -0.14 -0.46 
CEODUM 0.41 1.26 0.27 0.91 0.25 0.76 
CHAIRDUM 0.21 1.04 0.27 1.31 0.22 1.07 
OTHBDSTS 0.26 3.76*** 0.19 2.63*** 0.16 2.56** 
CROSSIT 3.04 9.90*** 3.15 10.45*** 2.68 9.46*** 
DIROWN 1.94 1.73* 2.28 2.61*** 1.83 1.57 
PREM30 -1.02 -2.10** -0.65 -1.29 -0.23 -0.42 
TROA 0.08 0.36 0.07 0.24 -0.07 -0.28 
TMB 0.03 0.78 0.03 0.75 0.04 1.32 
RELSIZE -0.00 -1.10 -0.00 -1.23 -0.01 -1.28 
BROA -1.34 -5.11*** -1.21 -4.68*** -1.13 -3.88*** 
BMB 0.03 2.71*** 0.04 2.91*** 0.03 2.04** 
N 1,463  1,463  1,463  
Wald  
Chi-squared 202.74***  180.25***  147.26***  
Pseudo 
R-squared 0.32  0.35  0.29  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 - continued 
 
Panel B ONBOARDZERO  ONBOARDONE  ONBOARDTWO  
Propensity 
matched Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat Coef. z-stat 
Intercept -2.68 -3.67*** -16.41 -14.28*** -15.50 -14.51*** 
SOA 0.56 1.79* 0.53 1.66* 0.30 0.88 
BDSIZE -0.05 -0.53 -0.01 -0.12 -0.12 -1.66* 
EXECDUM -0.39 -1.28 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.07 
CEODUM 0.54 1.52 0.22 0.69 0.08 0.23 
CHAIRDUM 0.06 0.25 0.18 0.76 0.07 0.29 
OTHBDSTS 0.23 2.96*** 0.17 2.03** 0.14 1.85* 
CROSSIT 3.00 8.65*** 3.03 8.85*** 2.65 8.01*** 
DIROWN 2.48 2.28** 2.91 3.40*** 2.59 2.16** 
PREM30 -1.30 -2.24** -0.86 -1.43 -0.31 -0.46 
TROA 0.09 0.37 0.08 0.26 -0.07 -0.24 
TMB 0.05 1.21 0.04 0.95 0.08 1.77* 
RELSIZE -0.00 -1.14 -0.01 -1.27 -0.01 -1.25 
BROA -1.46 -4.81*** -1.43 -4.69*** -1.37 -4.11*** 
BMB 0.03 3.12*** 0.04 3.75*** 0.04 3.18*** 
N 1,230  1,230  1,230  
Wald  
Chi-squared 180.91***  391.23***  356.49***  
Pseudo 
R-squared 0.31  0.34  0.28  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
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Table 9 
Proportion of directors appointed to the acquiring firm board 
This table presents the results of a generalised linear model predicting the proportion of the target firm board 
holding a board seat on the acquiring firm board. The dependent variable is measured alternatively for the first 
(PROPZERO), second (PROPONE) and third years (PROPTWO) the target firm is consolidated into the 
acquiring firm financial statements after a successful acquisition. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A PROPZERO  PROPONE  PROPTWO  
Full sample Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.33 0.43 -0.31 -0.40 -0.36 -0.56 
SOA 0.74 2.97*** 0.63 2.38** 0.48 1.81* 
BDSIZE -0.40 -3.75*** -0.34 -3.47*** -0.41 -3.83*** 
EXECRATIO -1.52 -2.07** -0.90 -1.03 -1.54 -1.73* 
TOTOTHBDSTS 0.11 3.17*** 0.06 1.91* 0.72 2.26** 
TOTDIROWN 0.25 0.44 0.57 1.24 0.73 1.75* 
TOTCROSSIT 0.52 6.51*** 0.56 7.16*** 0.46 7.06*** 
PREM30 -0.95 -2.23* -0.73 -1.54 -0.70 -1.58 
TROA 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.13 -0.10 -0.64 
TMB 0.02 0.64 0.02 0.41 0.05 1.22 
RELSIZE -0.00 -1.14 -0.00 -1.02 -0.01 -0.94 
BROA -1.04 -3.67*** -0.88 -3.27*** -0.81 -2.44** 
BMB 0.01 1.59 0.02 1.72* 0.01 0.86 
Year fixed effects Y  Y  Y  
Industry fixed 
effects Y  Y  Y  
N 263  263  263  
Panel B PROPZERO  PROPONE  PROPTWO  
Propensity matched Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept -0.99 -0.79 -1.94 -1.72* -1.32 -1.10 
SOA 0.87 2.83*** 0.78 2.39** 0.59 1.79* 
BDSIZE -0.32 -2.30** -0.31 -2.67*** -0.40 -3.20*** 
EXECRATIO -1.47 -1.60 -0.56 -0.57 -1.00 -1.04 
TOTOTHBDSTS 0.08 1.82* 0.07 1.75* 0.07 1.67* 
TOTDIROWN 0.52 0.93 0.55 0.99 0.93 1.99** 
TOTCROSSIT 0.53 4.95*** 0.61 5.97*** 0.48 6.49*** 
PREM30 -1.20 -2.23** -1.06 -1.60 -0.86 -1.45 
TROA 0.22 2.25** 0.26 2.49** 0.20 1.65* 
TMB 0.07 2.20** 0.07 2.26** 0.12 3.32*** 
RELSIZE -0.00 -0.95 -0.00 -1.12 -0.01 -0.89 
BROA -1.25 -4.08*** -1.14 -3.76*** -1.09 -3.13*** 
BMB 0.03 3.05*** 0.03 4.23*** 0.04 3.28*** 
Year fixed effects Y  Y  Y  
Industry fixed 
effects Y  Y  Y  
N 216  216  216  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
 
 
43 
 
Table 10 
Simultaneous equations estimation of the association between director retention 
and the use of schemes of arrangement 
This table presents the results of three-stage simultaneous equations estimation for the 
association between director retention and schemes of arrangement for the propensity score 
matched sample. The endogenous dependent variables are respectively the proportion of the 
target board that hold board seats on the merged entity one year after the acquisitions 
(PROPZERO) and an indicator variable denoting schemes of arrangement (SOA). All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 PROPZERO  SOA 
 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.13 1.17 0.08 0.21 
SOA 0.21 3.01*** - - 
PROPZERO - - 0.08 0.44 
BDSIZE -0.03 -2.85*** - - 
EXECRATIO -0.10 -1.00 - - 
TOTOTHBDSTS 0.01 1.61 - - 
TOTDIROWN 0.08 1.30 0.06 0.58 
TOTCROSSIT 0.09 8.69*** - - 
PREM30 -0.07 -1.36 - - 
TROA 0.03 1.26 0.02 0.44 
TMB 0.00 0.77 0.01 0.90 
RELSIZE -0.00 -0.41 - - 
BROA -0.22 -3.45*** 0.11 0.68 
BMB 0.00 1.57 -0.00 -0.38 
TOEHOLD - - -2.66 -7.56*** 
TSUBSHNO - - -0.03 -1.96* 
TDE - - -0.02 -2.09** 
TFCF - - -0.02 -0.14 
TSIZE - - 0.06 2.85*** 
BDE - - 0.01 0.98 
BFCF - - 0.12 0.49 
BSIZE - - -0.03 -1.740 
Year fixed effects Y    
Industry fixed effects Y    
N 216  216  
R-squared 0.43  0.39  
* is significant at 10%, ** is significant at 5%, and *** is significant at 1%. 
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Appendix 1 
Variable names and definitions 
Variable name Definition 
ONBOARDZERO An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director holds a 
board seat on the acquiring firm board for the first financial year the target 
firm is consolidated after the acquisition 
ONBOARDONE An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director holds a 
board seat on the acquiring firm board for the second financial year the 
target firm is consolidated after the acquisition 
ONBOARDTWO An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director holds a 
board seat on the acquiring firm board for the third financial year the 
target firm is consolidated after the acquisition 
SOA An indicator variable set as one if the acquisition is conducted as a 
Scheme of Arrangement 
EXECDUM An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director is an 
executive on the target firm board at the date of the takeover 
announcement 
CEODUM An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director is the 
Chief Executive Officer or Managing Director of the target firm at the 
date of the takeover announcement 
CHAIRDUM An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director is the 
Chairperson of the target firm board at the date of the takeover 
announcement 
OTHBDSTS The number of other board seats on ASX listed entities held by a specific 
target firm director at the date of the takeover announcement 
DIROWN The percentage ownership in the target firm by a specific target firm 
director at the date of the takeover announcement 
CROSSIT An indicator variable set as one if a specific target firm director also holds 
a position on the acquiring firm board at the date of the takeover 
announcement 
PROPZERO The proportion of the target firm board at the date of the takeover 
announcement that hold a board seat on the acquiring firm board for the 
first financial year the target firm is consolidated after the acquisition 
PROPONE The proportion of the target firm board at the date of the takeover 
announcement that hold a board seat on the acquiring firm board for the 
second financial year the target firm is consolidated after the acquisition 
PROPTWP The proportion of the target firm board at the date of the takeover 
announcement that hold a board seat on the acquiring firm board for the 
third financial year the target firm is consolidated after the acquisition 
BDSIZE The number of directors on the target firm board at the date of the 
takeover announcement 
EXECRATIO The ratio of executive directors to total board size for the target firm at the 
date of the takeover announcement 
TOTOTHBDSTS The total number of other board seats on ASX listed entities held by all 
target firm directors at the date of the takeover announcement 
TOTDIROWN The total percentage ownership in the target firm by all target firm 
directors at the date of the takeover announcement 
TOTCROSSIT The total number of target firm directors that also hold a board seat on the 
bidding firm board at the date of the takeover announcement 
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PREM30 The takeover premium measured as the initial offer price minus the target 
firm share price one month prior to the takeover announcement, divided 
by the target firm share price one month before the takeover 
announcement 
TROA Target firm return on assets for the financial year prior to the takeover 
TMB Target firm market-to-book ratio calculated at the end of the financial year 
prior to the takeover announcement 
TDE Target firm debt-to-equity ratio calculated at the end of the financial year 
prior to the takeover announcement 
TFCF Target firm free cash flow calculated as cash from operations minus 
dividends divided by total assets for the financial year prior to the 
takeover announcement 
TSIZE The size of the target firm measured using the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation three months prior to the takeover announcement 
RELSIZE The relative size of the target to bidder firm measured using market 
capitalisation of the respective firms three months prior to the takeover 
announcement 
BROA Acquiring firm return on assets for the year prior to the takeover 
BMB Acquiring firm market-to-book ratio calculated at the end of the financial 
year prior to the takeover announcement 
BDE Acquiring firm debt-to-equity ratio calculated at the end of the financial 
year prior to the takeover announcement 
BFCF Acquiring firm free cash flow calculated as cash from operations minus 
dividends divided by total assets for the financial year prior to the 
takeover announcement 
BSIZE The size of the acquiring firm measured using the natural logarithm of 
market capitalisation three months prior to the takeover announcement 
TOEHOLD The bidding firm ownership in the target firm at the date of the takeover 
announcement 
TSUBSHNO The number of substantial shareholders in the target firm at the date of the 
takeover announcement 
PAYT An indicator variable denoting acquisitions in which the payment method 
is exclusively cash 
MULT An indicator variable denoting acquisitions in which there are competing 
bids for the target firm 
BOWN The total percentage ownership in the acquiring firm by all acquiring firm 
directors at the date of the takeover announcement 
 
 
